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HOME RULE IN OHIO:
GENERAL LAWS, CONFLICTS, AND THE FAILURE
OF THE COURTS TO PROTECT THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION
MATTHEW MAHONEY*
ABSTRACT
The Home Rule Amendment to Ohio’s Constitution vest with municipalities the
power to legislate on issues of most concern to that locality. Ideally, the concept of
home rule creates shared powers between the state and the municipality. However, in
Ohio, such is not the case. Instead, the state has almost complete control despite the
home rule constitutional amendment. Although home rule is complicated historically
and practically with many working parts between the legislature and the municipality,
what is clear is that the courts play a substantial role in the doctrine’s application. The
court’s role is difficulty considering the competing interests, but the ultimate goal
should be to harmonize state and local law to allow flexibility, innovation, and to
recognize the needs of one part of the state may be different than another. Despite this
ultimate goal, Ohio courts have failed to promote the meaning of home rule and
allowed the state to retain too much power, essentially removing the Home Rule
Amendment. To restore the balance intended by the Ohio Constitution, it is critical the
Ohio Supreme Court revise its interpretation of the Amendment to allow for harmony
between the state and the municipalities.
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I. INTRODUCTION

“A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit
of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.”1
Ohio is nearing a constitutional crisis. At the center of this crisis is the balance of
power between the state legislature and municipalities, both of which have
constitutional power to legislate. The state legislature is vested with the power to make
all laws under Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 2 However, municipalities
throughout the state also have some legislative powers to meet the needs of their
communities through the Home Rule Amendment.3 It has been left to the courts to
balance these dueling provisions, but the courts have failed to provide a consistent
approach to resolving the disputes between these two powers. The inconsistency in
judicial interpretation has led to confusion and uncertainty. For example, the Ohio
Supreme Court has held that a city cannot regulate the use of firearms to certain

* J.D. expected, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, May 2019. Special thanks to all those who
provided guidance through the research and writing process to help complete this paper
including Alex Frondorf, Kevin F. O’Neill, and all those at Cleveland State Law Review. I also
extend my gratitude to my parents, Mark and Karen Mahoney, for always providing the support
I needed.
1

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127 (1831).

See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a
general assembly consisting of a senate and a house of representatives . . . ).
2

3 See OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (“Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all
powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police,
sanitary, and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”).
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locations,4 ban predatory lending,5 or regulate fracking,6 but cities can regulate the use
of tow trucks,7 regulate the location on manufactured homes,8 and limit the number of
bullets a gun can discharge in one round.9 In 2017, Justice DeWine voiced his
frustration with the court’s interpretation of the Home Rule Amendment: “[f]ew areas
of our law have proved as troublesome as the application of the Home Rule
Amendment.”10
It is no wonder the Home Rule Amendment has given Ohio courts trouble; most
home rule provisions across the nation are vague and ambiguous, making a “clear
invitation to policy making by judges” to which courts have “no alternative but to
accept the invitation.”11 In just the last decade, Ohio courts have seen an influx of
4

See City of Cleveland v. State, 942 N.E.2d 370, 372 (Ohio 2010). The Ohio Supreme
Court struck down six ordinances passed by the City of Cleveland involving firearms: the
possession of firearms by minors; possessing weapons on private property; possessing certain
weapons in public places; prohibiting children’s access to firearms; prohibiting the sale of
assault weapons; and the registration of hand guns. The Court held that the ordinances conflicted
with a general state law which extends the right to bear arms to the fullest extent possible under
the Ohio Constitution.
5 See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ohio 2006). The
Court struck down a City of Cleveland ordinance which prohibited predatory lending using a
formula to identify loans that could be predatory in nature. The Court held the state law
regulating lending was a general law and Cleveland’s ordinance conflicted with the state-wide
scheme. For a more thorough and in-depth discussion of this case and the Court’s application
of the Home Rule Amendment, see Brett Altier, Municipal Predatory Lending Regulation in
Ohio: The Disproportionate Impact of Preemption on Ohio’s Cities, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 125,
126 (2011).
6

See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128, 133 (Ohio 2015). The
Court found a municipal regulation that required the obtaining of a license to frack conflicted
with a state law which permitted fracking. For more of a discussion of Beck Energy Corp., see
infra Part IV.
7 See City of Cleveland v. State, 5 N.E.3d 644, 647 (Ohio 2014). Here, the Ohio Supreme
Court found that a state law impermissibly violated the Home Rule Amendment by enacting a
law that regulated the tow trucking industry when the City of Cleveland had regulations for the
industry already that were stricter than the state law.
8 See City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 967–68 (Ohio 2002). The Court found that
a state law improperly encroached on municipal power under the Home Rule Amendment when
it passed legislation prohibiting the ability of municipalities from regulating the use, placement,
and structure of manufactured homes.
9 See City of Cincinnati v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514, 532 (Ohio 2005). For more discussion
on this case, see infra Part IV.
10

Dayton v. State, 87 N.E.3d 176, 191 (Ohio 2017) (DeWine, J., dissenting). Justice
DeWine further commented that “we have considered no fewer than 100 cases . . . [t]he sheer
volume of these case is indicative of—and a consequence of—our failure to articulate and apply
clear and consistent standards.” Id.
11

Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 660–61 (1963). Sandalow discusses the ambiguity in home rule
provisions around the nation and argues that courts struggle to determine a set test because “the
language of constitutional home rule provisions provides remarkably little guidance
concerning” questions of what is a local power and what is a state power. Id. at 658. Further,
even those constitutional amendments that do define certain aspects of home rule, the “language
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litigation invoking the doctrine of home rule across vast issues, greatly influencing the
way local and state government operate.12 The need for judicial certainty and
consistency in Ohio regarding home rule is now more important than ever as Ohio
continues to face new issues. But the Ohio Supreme Court has struggled to create a
rule that makes the home rule analysis clear, which “has led to wildly inconsistent
results.”13
This article addresses two main issues that arise under the current home rule
analysis in Ohio and provides a historical analysis for changing it. First, the judicially
created Canton test, which determines if a state law is a general law, conflicts with the
purpose of home rule and strictly limits its application. 14 Second, the current conflict
analysis, which includes a conflict by implication test, grants Ohio courts with too
much discretion in determining when there is a true conflict.15 This discretion leads to
courts engaging in policymaking. 16 Taken together, the Ohio home rule analysis is
inconsistent, unstable, and cannot continue in its current form. Ohio courts should
modify the Canton test and employ a balancing test to determine if a state law is a
general law. Further, Ohio should reject the conflict by implication test, finding
conflicts only when there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict using a pure head-on
collision test.
Part II of this Note explains the background of home rule and how the doctrine has
developed through case law in Ohio. Part III discusses the Canton test and the conflict
test as currently adopted in Ohio. Lastly, Part IV discusses alternatives to the current
analysis including how other states analyze home rule. Part IV also proposes a new
test to provide consistency and stability to the home rule analysis that is firmly rooted
in the historical context of home rule.

employed . . . is barely more instructive.” Id. at 660. As Sandalow points out, Ohio’s Home
Rule Amendment suffers from ambiguous language, but Ohio is surely not alone. See id.
12 See, e.g., Dayton, 87 N.E.3d at 179 (use of speed cameras); Mendenhall v. City of Akron,
881 N.E.2d 255, 265 (Ohio 2008) (speed cameras in school zones); Ohioans for Concealed
Carry, Inc. v. Clyde, 896 N.E.2d 967, 968 (Ohio 2008) (gun restrictions in public places);
Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 515–16 (semiautomatic gun regulations); Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d
at 133 (fracking); City of Cleveland v. State, 5 N.E.3d at 646–47 (tow truck licensing); Am.
Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ohio 2006) (financial regulations
relating to predatory lending); City of Lima v. State, 909 N.E.2d 616, 618 (Ohio 2009)
(requirement of city workers to live within the city).
13 Dayton, 87 N.E. 3d at 196–97 (DeWine, J., dissenting) (arguing that the current home
rule analysis is fatally flawed and must be changed).

See Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 967–68 (“[T]o constitute a general law for purposes of homerule analysis, a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment,
(2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth
police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative
power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4)
prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.”).
14

15

See generally GEORGE VAUBEL, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN OHIO 677–39 (1978).

16 See GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY 181
(1985) (noting that “further dispute will generate further twists and turns in interpretation as
different circumstances conspire to negate previous interpretations.”).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss1/11

4

2019]

HOME RULE IN OHIO
II.

117

II. HOME RULE IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

A. What is Home Rule?

Before discussing home rule and the complexities of judicial interpretation of the
doctrine, it is important to define what home rule is and what it is not. 17 Generally,
home rule is the idea that local municipalities should have the authority to legislate
over areas of purely local concern and the power to address local needs without the
state’s interference.18 In this way, home rule can be likened to the principle of
federalism enjoyed between our federal government and the states. 19 Home rule does
not, and cannot, mean complete local autonomy; municipalities “must always remain
integral parts of state government.”20 Thus, home rule should be understood as a
concept where municipalities have some autonomy, but not complete autonomy. 21 It
is the balancing of municipal authority that is the root of the home rule issue for courts.
However, a single definition is difficult to formulate because home rule is often
misunderstood and can mean different things to each state. 22 Part of the confusion is
17

The concept of home rule is generally thought to have come from Alexis de Tocqueville
in his famous work Democracy in America. See id. at 159–60. In that work, de Tocqueville
discussed his admiration for the structure of the U.S. government in the 1830s and specifically
stressed the importance of local government in the concept of liberty. He explained that “[t]ownmeetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s
reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it.” DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 127.
De Tocqueville further noted that “I have heard citizens attribute the power and prosperity of
their county to a multitude of reasons, but they all placed the advantages of local institutions in
the foremost rank.” Id. at 186. Thus, home rule can be understood as involving three overarching
themes: agency theory; practical politics; and philosophy of government. See id. For more on
the discussion of local democracy, it’s ideals, and the contemplations of local government by
the founding fathers, see ROBERT NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 89–116 (2005).
18

DAVID R. BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES: AUTONOMY, POLITICS, AND
POLICY 71 (2003). The idea of home rule was to “construct a strict division between state and
local powers.” Id.
19 HOWARD MCBAIN, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 110 (1916) (“Indeed
it would seem to be even more reasonable to apply such a principle to relations between cities
and the state government than to relations between the states and the national government.”).
Daniel Elazar, an influential scholar in the field of federalism, noted that although home rule
may not have “brought all the benefits its champions sought, it did represent a major step in the
transformation (or restoration) of local government as a recognized partner in its own right
within the federal system.” Daniel J. Elazar, State-Local Relations: Union and Home Rule, in
GOVERNING PARTNERS: STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (Russel L. Hanson,
ed., 1998).
20 Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 269, 280 (1968).

“[L]ocal governments function within a larger society, and on matters that extend beyond
a single community, each locality must act within the legal framework of the overarching state
and nation.” DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL JR., HOME RULE IN AMERICA:
A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 1 (2001).
21

22 Vanlandingham, supra note 20, at 279 (“It is very difficult to formulate a precise
definition of home rule, inasmuch as there exists no unanimity of agreement among authorities
concerning its meaning.”); see also Sandalow, supra note 11, at 644 (“there is perhaps no term
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due to the “dual purposes” that home rule invokes as a political and legal doctrine. 23
Politically, home rule is thought of as freedom of local government to enact laws they
see proper for their local constituents. 24 To that end, local government claims to have
better political judgment and argues that local government can better serve local needs
that the state cannot address effectively. 25 As a legal concept, home rule is thought of
as a method for distributing power to legislate between the state and municipalities. 26
These distinctions are important when discussing home rule and the historical reasons
for its adoption.
B.

B. Pre-Home Rule and the Establishment of Home Rule in the United States

The development of home rule is complicated and involves many working parts. 27
However, three main changes in the political and economic environment within the
United States precipitated the doctrine’s creation: Dillon’s Rule; the growth of cities;
and the Progressive Movement.28

in the literature of political science or law which is more susceptible to misconception and
variety of meaning than ‘home rule.’”); Rubin G. Cohn, Municipal Revenue Powers in the
Context of Constitutional Home Rule, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 27, 27 (1956) (describing
constitutional home rule as a “paradoxical enigma, attractive and appealing, yet unattainable to
any significant degree.”).
23 Sandalow, supra note 11, at 644. Most people identify the political implications of home
rule, while ignoring the doctrine as a legal concept. This leads to confusion and oftentimes
frustration when discussing the doctrine. Id.
24

See id. at 644–46. Sandalow explains that politically, home rule is understood to be
“synonymous with local autonomy, the freedom of a local unit of government to pursue selfdetermined goals without interference.” Id. at 644. These ideas are rooted in our American
democracy; that the government closest to the people can best serve their interests. But home
rule “as a political symbol lacks precise meaning because of its failure to specify either the
extent of local autonomy or the manner in which it is to be achieved.” Id. at 645. Instead, it is
just an ideal to aspire to. In any event, “[c]itizens and scholars who have an interest in the quality
of democracy and its relationship to the quality of civil society in our communities cannot ignore
home rule and its related issues.” KRANE, RIGOS & HILL, JR., supra note 21, at 19.
25

See Vanlandingham, supra note 20, at 280.

See Sandalow, supra note 11, at 645 (“As a legal doctrine . . . home rule does not describe
the state or condition of local autonomy, but a particular method for distributing power between
state and local governments.”).
26

27

For a more extensive history of municipal government and the political ideology that
manifested into home rule prior to 1875, see Frank J. Goodnow, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE: A
STUDY IN ADMINISTRATION 1–32 (1897) (discussing colonial municipal governments and the
adoption of city and township power as “an importation from England rather than indigenous
growth.”). Further, for more information on the development of home rule as a political and
legal doctrine since the “home rule movement,” see David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2255 (2003) (discussing the history of home rule with particular
emphasis on the idea that home rule “enable[s] cities to promote visions of urban governance
that the prior legal regime had foreclosed.”).
28 See CLARK, supra note 16, at 77; BERMAN, supra note 18, at 55; DELOS WILCOX, THE
AMERICAN CITY: A PROBLEM IN DEMOCRACY 14 (1906).
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Before 1875, most states followed Dillon’s Rule. 29 John Dillon, an influential jurist
from Iowa, argued in 1868 that municipalities only had three categories of powers:
those “expressly granted” by the state, those implied as an incident, and those
“essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation.”30 Essentially, municipalities only had those powers granted to them by
the state.31 Dillon’s Rule created a “general doctrine of state supremacy” which in turn
gave states the “constitutional rationale for intervening” in local affairs.32 At the same
time, cities grew substantially in size and power. 33 For example, in 1790, New York
had a population of 33,000 people, but in 1830, the population had increased to
202,000.34 Along with this growth came important issues that needed to be solved
quickly and efficiently.35 Generally, states believed that they were better suited than
municipalities to deal with the difficult issues that came with this dramatic growth. 36
These states employed Dillon’s Rule as a basis for extensive intervention. However,
it became abundantly clear that states were ill equipped to handle the numerous

29 CLARK, supra note 16, at 77 (“Dillon’s rule is the major judicial model of local
government powers and dominates American debates of the proper role of localities with respect
to state governments.”).
30 See City of Clinton v. The Cedar Rapids and Mo. River R.R., 24 IOWA 455, 462–63 (Iowa
1868). Dillon discussed the idea of local powers in this famous opinion where he spoke out
against municipal power, with the strictly limiting rule of that power bearing his name.
31 “Municipal corporations owe their origins to and derive their powers and rights wholly
from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As
it creates, so it may destroy.” Id.

John G. Grumm & Russel D. Murphy, Dillon’s Rule Reconsidered, 416 ANNALS OF AM.
ACAD. OF POL. SOC. SCI. 120, 123–24 (1974). This concept is also known as the “doctrine of
expressed powers” and brought together many individuals who wanted more local autonomy
because of perceived unfair influence by state governments who refused to give municipalities
many expressed powers. See id. (“The continual legislative interference in purely local matters
. . . has caused us to resort to the remedy . . . to protect the sphere of freedom of private
individuals.”).
32

33 For more information on how cities grew in size and power during this time period, see
Patricia E. Beeson, David N. DeJong & Werner Troesken, Population Growth in U.S. Counties,
1840–1990, 31 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 669 (2001) (analyzing population statistic trends with
the growth of the economy, infrastructure, and access to natural resources).
34 BERMAN, supra note 18, at 55. “Much of the growth of these cities came from the
migration of Americans from farm areas, but foreign immigration, largely from Europe, also
contributed a substantial amount.” Id.
35 For instance, “local officials were suddenly faced with the need to provide useable
streets, sanitation facilities, an adequate water supply, and competent fire and police services,”
among other public health concerns. Id.
36

These feelings surfaced because of the magnitudes of the issues that cities faced and how
quickly they were growing. Further, there were concerns that the new populations in the cities
were ill-equipped to govern themselves because of their backgrounds and unfamiliarity with
city issues. These fears were worsened by the corruption and political machines that often
heavily influenced local government. See id. at 55–57.
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issues,37 and in the early 1870s, local protests over state intervention began to spring
up, questioning the “wisdom or fairness of the state actions.” 38
The Progressive Movement was woven throughout the development of Dillon’s
Rule and local frustration with state interference. The Movement began in the late
nineteenth century and lasted into the early twentieth century, dramatically changing
political life and, important to this note, cities.39 It grew out of the “inequalities of the
‘Gilded Age’” and unified diverse groups who “shared a common distrust of laissezfaire capitalism, unrestrained monopolies, and the corrupt political machines of the
era.”40 The influence of the Progressive Movement and the increased frustration with
state interference led to an era of state constitutional change “toward lessening state
legislative interference in the affairs of municipal governments, particularly the larger
cities.”41
As a response to Dillon’s Rule, increased state intervention, and the Progressive
Movement, Americans turned to home rule to push for municipal reform. 42 In 1875,
Missouri became the first state to adopt the doctrine of home rule. 43 By 1963, twentyeight states adopted home rule in one form or another.44 These states rejected Dillon’s
Rule and instead adopted a system where “localities are primarily responsive to the
preferences of their residents” and give residents a “source of legitimacy” and
increased “functional diversity.”45 Most home rule provisions were adopted as an
amendment to state constitutions.46 Some states had more powerful provisions, while

37 “It had become clear in many parts of the country that state intervention had done little
to cure the problems of the cities.” Id. at 61.
38

See id.

39

The Progressive Movement and thoughts about cities is perhaps best seen through the
eyes of Delos Wilcox, a historian who wrote extensively on the topic of municipal rule during
the Movement. He observed that “[n]ot only is the city involved most deeply in the great
political experiment of the present and the future, but it is the dominating element in that
experiment.” DELOS F. WILCOX, THE AMERICAN CITY: A PROBLEM IN DEMOCRACY 14 (1906).
For more information on the Progressive Movement and urban reform, see Alexandra Lough,
The Politics of Urban Reform in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 1870–1920, 75 AM. J.
ECO. AND SOC. 8 (2016).
40

STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION 46 (2011).

41

BERMAN, supra note 18, at 62.

42 Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme Court called Missouri’s constitutional
provision granting municipalities exclusive control in areas where the state could not interfere
imperio in imperium, meaning a government within a government, the most common form that
states employ home rule. See St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893).
43

MO. CONST. art. IX, §§ 16, 23 (1875).

44

Sandalow, supra note 11, at 645.

45

CLARK, supra note 16, at 78.

46

Sandalow, supra note 11, at 668. Home rule has been adopted constitutionally and
through legislative enactment, or sometimes both. Most states favored the constitutional
amendment, believing that this would grant more power and protections to municipalities.
Legislative enactments suffer from the flaw that the state could decide at any time to no longer
comply with home rule and repeal the statute. Further, judicial interpretation of home rule
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others adopted more ceremonial ones. Ohio adopted one of the more powerful
provisions to reflect Ohioans’ will to reject Dillon’s Rule and give municipalities
power independent of state influence. 47
C.

C. Home Rule in Ohio

Ohio, like other states influenced by the Progressive Movement and inspired to
reject Dillon’s Rule, adopted home rule during Ohio’s 1912 constitutional
convention.48 The new constitution now included Article XVIII, Section 3, which
states: “Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local selfgovernment and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and
other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”49 Because each
state’s adoption of home rule is unique, a brief history of why and how Ohio came to
adopt home rule is necessary.
Before the 1912 constitutional convention, Ohio adopted Dillon’s Rule in
Bloom v. City of Xenia 50 in 1877. During this time, Ohioans developed the same
distaste for state interference in their local affairs. Specifically, Ohioans felt state laws
burdened economic growth and the transition from an agrarian society into an
industrial powerhouse.51 Ohio’s current political system lacked any meaningful local
governance, leaving voters feeling a lack of legitimacy and confidence in their
democratic system.52 To further frustrate and anger Ohioans, the Ohio Supreme Court
decided two cases in 1902 that solidified Dillon’s Rule, adopting a restrictive approach
to the power of municipalities in relation to the state. 53 By 1910, frustrations boiled

statutes has confined municipal powers to only those that are expressly stated within the statute.
See id. at 668–70.
47 For more information on other states and their home rule provisions, see KRANE, RIGOS
& HILL, JR., supra note 21. For more reading on Ohio’s history as it relates to home rule prior
to the 1912 constitutional amendment, see Harvey Walker, Municipal Government in Ohio
Before 1912, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1948).
48 See John Gotherman, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio Since 1960, 33 OHIO ST. L. J. 589,
591 (1972). Of course, the 1912 Ohio constitutional convention was not merely to adopt home
rule, but was meant to address a number of other serious issues within Ohio. One of the main
issues, however, was the restructuring of power between municipalities and the state
government. See STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 40, at 45–51.
49

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.

32 Ohio St. 461, 465 (1877) (holding that the power of municipalities is “strictly limited”
and only has that power “expressly granted or clearly implied, and no other”).
50

51 STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 40, at 46. This was especially true in Ohio who
saw during this time a great “expansion of the railroads, technological innovation, rapid
industrialization, and a wave of southern and eastern European immigration.” Id.

See id. Although during this time period there was “creation of enormous wealth,” the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries “also saw the emergence of what seemed to be a
permanent underclass, urban slums, and the worst depression the country had yet experienced.”
Id. The creation of this economic class divide allowed for those at the bottom to feel distrust in
the government who did not seem to have their interests in mind. See id. at 46–48.
52

53 See State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Beacom, 64 N.E. 427, 428 (Ohio 1902) (holding the
municipal code granting power to local governments was unconstitutional as it conflicted with
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over and Ohioans pushed to overhaul their current constitution, voting to hold a
constitutional convention 693,263 to 67,718.54 During the 1912 constitutional
convention, which was dominated by Progressives, 55 one of the most important tasks
was to give municipalities more power and independence from state interference. 56
The framers of the Home Rule Amendment had three ideas in mind when
crafting the Amendment: to “liberate municipalities from the control of the state” by
giving municipalities the power to exclusively govern over local affairs; to give power
to municipalities to own and operate utilities; to “grant charter municipalities the right
to exercise self-determination over their form of government.” 57 Further, the drafters
intended the Home Rule Amendment to “reverse the rule that municipal powers were
strictly limited by the legislature to allow cities to exercise all powers of local
government.”58 With these purposes in mind, the constitutional convention adopted
the Home Rule Amendment which the voters of Ohio approved, along with thirtythree other amendments to the Ohio constitution.59

the state’s general power to legislate); State ex rel. Kinsely v. Jones, 64 N.E. 424, 425 (Ohio
1902) (finding municipal law similarly in conflict with constitution as discussed in Beacom).
54

STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 40, at 47. One commenter at the time noted that
the vote was so lopsided because “[n]ever before in the sixty-year span has this date fallen at
such a psychologically favorable time. There was a pent-up demand among various groups for
such reforms as municipal home rule, legal protection of workers, improvements in court
procedures, and woman suffrage.” Robert E. Cushman, Voting Organic Laws: The Action of the
Ohio Electorate in the Revision of the State Constitution in 1912, 28 POL. SCI. Q. 208, 210
(1913).
55

STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 40, at 47.

56

See id. at 48.

57

KRANE, RIGOS & HILL JR., supra note 21, at 331.

58

STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 40, at 50. The Home Rule Amendment was seen
as an explicit rejection of Dillon’s Rule because of its strict withholding of power from
municipalities.
59 See id. at 53. Many of the other amendments concerned the judiciary, specifically the
“structure and operation of the courts to address the problem of overcrowded dockets and to
limit the ability of the Ohio Supreme Court to hold acts of the legislature unconstitutional.” Id.
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III. OHIO JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF HOME RULE, THE CANTON TEST,
AND THE CONFLICT ANALYSIS
D.

A. Development of Ohio Home Rule Jurisprudence

Interpreting the Ohio Home Rule Amendment is no easy task. 60 Like many other
state’s home rule provision, Ohio home rule suffers from being ambiguous. 61 Because
of this ambiguity, courts were naturally thrusted into the interpretation of the
Amendment. Commentators have noted that this ambiguity leads to “ad hoc decisions
in balancing state and local interests because they have failed to establish firm
guidelines.”62 This is precisely what happened in Ohio. Thus, for a strong home rule
doctrine in any state, the “suggested role for the courts requires the exercise of
judgment—and self-restraint—on their part.”63 With Ohio’s ambiguous Home Rule
Amendment, there is a “risk that courts may lay down rules which are too
restrictive.”64 The tendency of the courts to adopt more restrictive approaches to home
rule erodes the purpose of home rule and leads to judicial uncertainty in an already
complicated field.65
A rule for the home rule analysis eventually took shape in Ohio. To determine if a
state law preempts a municipal law, Ohio courts developed a three-part test, each of
which must be satisfied for preemption:66 (1) the state law must be in conflict with the
municipal ordinance; (2) the ordinance is an exercise of police power, rather than local

60

Many commentators and scholars have noted the difficulty in interpreting home rule
amendments. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 18, at 71–73 (“In practice… courts have found it
difficult to distinguish between what is a local affair and what is of statewide concern.”);
Sandalow, supra note 11, at 661 (“Without the benefit of guidance from history, constitutional
tradition, or sharply delineated principle, courts have been required to grapple with the questions
of what affairs are municipal . . . [a]cclaim has not been their reward.”); CLARK, supra note 16,
at 172 (the home rule “practical provisions are less clear than its rhetorical image.
[I]mplementing home rule . . . has been a tortious affair.”).
“The Ohio provision . . . is perhaps the worst of such provisions. [T]hese sections ‘have
been highly and often bitterly controversial even from the time they were first proposed.’”
Vanlandingham, supra note 20, at 288.
61

62 George Vaubel, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio (1976-1995), 22 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 143,
213 (1995).
63

Sandalow, supra note 11, at 721.

64

See id. at 707.

65 See Vaubel, supra note 62, at 148. Vaubel argues that Ohio courts have been too willingly
to “embark upon a court of expansion of state authority by too often ignoring the validity of
pre-existing restrictive theories . . . [C]ourts need to reexamine and reassert their role as the
defender of constitutional home rule against unnecessary expansive invasion by legislative
authority, the predatory nature of which was so evident in pre-Home Rule days . . . .” Id.
66 The three-part test developed over the years of judicial interpretation. It was first
constructed in Auxter v. Toledo, 183 N.E.2d 920 (1962) and then solidified in Ohio Ass’n
Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. City of N. Olmsted, 602 N.E.2d 1147 (Ohio 1992) and City
of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ohio 2002).
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self-government; and (3) the statute is a general law. 67 This Note only focuses on the
first and third prongs of this test; the general law analysis and the conflict analysis.
E.

B. The Canton Test and the General Law Analysis

Delegates to the 1912 Ohio constitutional convention believed the term general
laws meant laws of general application “which have uniform application throughout
the state and laws dealing with matters of a general, not local concern, which in fact
and in form touched the whole state.”68 Over the years, Ohio courts developed certain
factors that went into the general law analysis, and in 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court
attempted to consolidate almost one hundred years of that case law as it relates to
general laws.69 In Canton v. State,70 the Court laid out a four-part test to determine if
a law is a general law, deriving the elements from precedent throughout the years since
the passage of the Amendment in 1912.71 Under this analysis, a statute is a general law
if the statute:
(1) [is] part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2)
appl[ies] to all parts of the state alike and operates uniformly throughout
the state, (3) set[s] forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than
purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation
to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe[s] a
rule of conduct upon citizens generally. 72
As discussed more fully below, the Canton test is problematic mostly because the
four-part test only considers the state law, without taking into consideration the
municipal law.73 A balancing test better suits this complicated legal topic because a
balancing test would focus on the totality of the circumstances, rather than just
analyzing the state law.
F.

C. The Conflict Analysis

The Ohio Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of conflicting laws in Struthers
v. Sokol.74 There, the Court held that there is a conflict when “an ordinance permits or

67 See Ohio Ass’n Private Detective Agencies, 602 N.E.2d at 1149–50. This three-part test
has essentially been used throughout home rule jurisprudence, but was first ascertained as a
three-part test in this case. Since 1992, Ohio courts exclusively use this test for the home rule
analysis.
68

VAUBEL, supra note 15, at 771.

69

See City of Dayton v. State, 85 N.E.3d 176, 191–92 (Ohio 2017) (DeWine, J.,
dissenting). A full analysis of the development of the Canton test through case law is not
necessary for this Note, but more information can be found at, VAUBEL, supra note 15, at 769–
813.
70

See generally Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 965.

71

See id. at 966–68 (discussing the major landmark cases involving the development of the
general law analysis as the basis for the creation of the Canton test).
72

Id. at 968.

73

See infra Part IV, § A.

74

See generally Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E. 519 (Ohio 1923).
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license that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.” 75 This became
known as the “head-on collision” test where “there must be a direct confrontation” to
find a conflict, thus invalidating the municipal law. 76 In interpreting the conflict
language of the Home Rule Amendment, the Sokol court held that the “opposition or
collision must be expressed” and cannot be “left to inferences.” 77 This test is a strict
approach to the conflict analysis, only finding a conflict when absolutely necessary
and was made in accordance with the intent of the Home Rule Amendment.78
Ohio courts have since eroded the Sokol decision and expanded the meaning of
conflict as to further limit municipal powers. The so called “conflict by implication”
test recognizes that “sometimes a municipal ordinance will indirectly prohibit what a
state statute permits or vice versa.”79 However, it should be noted that the Sokol court
expressly rejected a test based on inferences.80 Thus, the current landscape of the Ohio
conflict analysis appears to be in disarray. 81 To make matters worse, Ohio courts,
including the Supreme Court, have essentially engaged in picking and choosing when
it comes to which conflict analysis the court will use, and sometimes they use both. 82
In the end, this allows courts to pick and choose what is a state concern and what is a
local concern, without allowing for local discretion when there is no direct conflict.

75

See id. at 521.

VAUBEL, supra note 15, at 685. The test has also been referred to as the “contrary
directives” test where “no real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declares something to be
right which the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa.” See Mendenhall v. City of Akron,
881 N.E.2d 255, 262–63 (Ohio 2007). Either way, courts look to see if the two laws direct
Ohioans to do different things.
76

77

VAUBEL, supra note 15, at 685–87.

78

The Constitutional Convention stressed three main points with respect to the conflict
analysis: “(1) There could be conflict without express denial of municipal authority. (2) A
stricter municipal regulation than that imposed by the state was not to be treated as being in
conflict with it. (3) A less strict municipal regulation was to be treated as being in conflict.” Id.
at 708.
79

Mendenhall, 881 N.E.2d at 263. The idea of conflict by implication is most easily
explained by an example. For instance, imagine a state legislature forbids having a gun that can
fire more than thirty-one bullets in a round. The statute expressly prohibits someone from
possessing a gun that can fire more than thirty-one bullets per round, but it also implicitly
permits someone having a gun that can fire less. Thus, any municipal law restricting that number
to, say ten bullets per round, would implicitly be in conflict with the state law. Using this
example, it is hard to imagine a situation in which a municipal law would not conflict with a
state law in some way. See City of Cincinatti v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514, 515 (Ohio 2005).
80

VAUBEL, supra note 15, at 707.

81
The conflict by implication test has been seen as a way for courts to rescue a state law
that does not truly conflict with the municipal law. See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of
Cleveland, 858 N.E. 2d 766, 791 (Ohio 2006) (Resnick, J., dissenting) (arguing that, as the
majority concedes, the statutes are not in direct conflict “but along comes the majority with a
newly created ‘conflict-by-analysis test’” to save the law in question).
82 Altier, supra note 5, at 147 (noting that “Ohio courts have been unpredictable as to which
conflict analysis they will apply in any scenario . . . .”).
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IV. MODIFYING THE CANTON TEST AND DEVELOPING A NEW CONFLICT
ANALYSIS
A. The Canton Test Should be Modified and Ohio Courts Should Adopt a
Balancing Approach

Creating an appropriate test for the general law analysis is not simple and no one
test may be perfect for this area of the law, but the Canton test has failed to provide
Ohioans the protections that home rule is supposed to offer. 83 The Canton test is
inconsistent, strictly limits the application of municipalities’ home rule powers, and
ignores the municipalities’ law. Therefore, Ohio courts should adopt a balancing test
that considers the totality of the circumstances, including the Canton test factors
currently used.
1.

1. The Canton Test Fails to Apply the Home Rule Analysis Correctly

Like the conflict analysis discussed below, the Canton test suffers from being
inconsistent. The interpretation of the four-part test varies not only between the
justices on the Ohio Supreme Court, but between the Ohio appellate courts as well. 84
Proponents of the Canton test argue that because each “home rule case involves unique
facts” and “no two statutes are exactly alike,” there are bound to be inconsistencies.85
Thus, just because cases come out differently does not mean that they are inconsistent,
but rather reflective that the home rule analysis requires a “fact-intensive” inquiry with
“varying facts applied to varying statutes” which “compel varying outcomes.”86
Although the Canton test is fact intensive, this is does not explain how two similar
cases come out differently, or how appellate courts and Ohio Supreme Court justices
themselves routinely argue about the application of the test. 87
Moreover, the Canton test places strict limits on municipal home rule powers.
Because the Canton test is flexible to judicial maneuvering, courts can interpret state
laws to be general laws more often than the court should. For many reasons, state

83 “Due primarily to the dynamic nature of American society—altering social, economic,
and technological factors can change a local function today into a state function tomorrow—no
home rule plan satisfactory to everyone can probably ever be devised.” Vanlandingham, supra
note 20, at 297.
84 City of Dayton v. State, 36 N.E.3d 235, 245 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015), rev’d, 87 N.E.3d 176,
179 (Ohio 2017).
85 Dayton, 87 N.E.3d at 187. The Court also pointed out that Ohioans have not used their
constitutional right to alter the language of the Home Rule Amendment, thus, there is additional
support that the Canton test should not abandoned. However, this argument is not credible
because we cannot say each time the people do not act, they are satisfied with how the
government is operating. Constitutional amendments are not so easy to accomplish as the Court
made it seem.
86

Id. at 186.

87 In fact, it’s interesting to note that the case in which Justice Fischer defended the Canton
test, the Court reversed the appellate court who found that the state law satisfied the home rule
analysis. See Dayton, 87 N.E.3d at 187. Further, the decision had only three justices join the
main opinion, with two more filing concurring opinions holding that the law violated Canton in
a different way, and two more justices filing a dissenting opinion. See id. This is hardly
inconsistency because of different fact patterns.
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courts “frequently rule in favor of the state” when it comes to home rule. 88 In fact,
courts favor the state so much so that “when a state supreme court in a case involving
municipal versus state interest rules against the state and in favor of the municipality,
its decision is usually noteworthy.”89 In using the Canton test, Ohio courts have
managed to justify favoring the state under the guise of a legal doctrine. This
favoritism of state law creates an implicit limitation on home rule authority.
The Canton test favors state law because the analysis focuses only on the
state law and disregards the municipal law. When using the Canton test, each of the
parts look to the state law, but do not address how the municipal law effects the local
citizens or interacts with the state law.90 Thus, judges have a narrow view of the state
law and do not consider the nature of the municipal law or how the laws interact and
overlap. This plainly ignores the purpose and nature of home rule which invariably
involves an analysis of both state and municipal law.91 This focus leads to judges not
considering a plethora of other factors that should be taken into consideration when
applying the general law analysis. Some of these factors include how the municipal
88

Vanlandingham, supra note 20, at 293. Vanlandingham notes that there are three
practical concerns that state courts may have. First, state courts, specifically the state supreme
court, is a coequal body with the state legislature and may input bias because of this relationship.
This relationship, in turn, creates a presumption that state laws are constitutional. See id. Second,
the “determination of the character of governmental functions is admittedly a very difficult
task.” Id. Lastly, Vanlandingham notes that because the state has some sort of interest in most
governmental functions, the “judiciary usually allows it to prevail” even if the interest is only
minor. Id.
89

Id. Justice Cardozo, then a justice of the New York Court of Appeals, exemplified the
favoritism state courts have towards state laws noting that “. . . affairs, though concerns of a
city, are subject none the less to regulation through the usual forms of legislation if they are
concerns also of the state.” Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713 (N.Y. 1929).
90

The first part of the Canton test asks whether the state law is part of a comprehensive
legislative enactment. See Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 968. This includes whether the state law is in
furtherance of some larger scheme the state has adopted. See Clermont Envtl. Reclamation Co.
v. Wiederhold, 442 N.E.2d 1278, 1280 (Ohio 1982); see also Ohio Ass’n Private Detective
Agencies, Inc. v. City of N. Olmsted, 602 N.E.2d 1147, 1149 (Ohio 1992). The second part asks
whether the state law operates uniformly throughout the state. See Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 968.
Thus, the state law must “apply to all parts of the state alike,” rather than just some parts of the
state. Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 167 N.E. 158, 159 (Ohio 1929). Third, the Canton test asks
whether the state law is a police, sanitary, or similar regulation that does not merely limit
municipal power. See Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 968. State laws that “purport only to grant or to
limit the legislative powers of a municipal corporation” are not general laws. W. Jefferson v.
Robinson, 205 N.E.2d 382, 383 (Ohio 1965). Lastly, the Canton test asks whether the state law
prescribes a “rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 968. Thus, the
state law is not a general law if it only relates to some citizens or group of people but not others.
See Youngstown v. Evans, 168 N.E. 844, 845 (Ohio 1929). As one can see, each part of the
Canton test analyzes the state law, but the municipal law is absent from the discussion.
VAUBEL, supra note 15, at 11. Vaubel noted that home rule, “in addition to a vesting of
power, it is a distribution of power by the people between two levels of government—state and
local.” Id. Thus, “home rule becomes a fitting together of various state-municipal corporation
relationships evidencing varying degrees of municipal autonomy.” Id. Ohio courts ignore this
dynamic when they use the Canton test without considering the municipal law. The issues that
implicate home rule usually have some compelling local interest involved and by ignoring the
municipal law, Ohio courts disregard those important interests.
91

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

15

128

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:113

law interacts with the state law, reasons that the municipality passed the law in the
first place, and the individual needs of the municipality.
2.

2. A New Balancing Test

Ohio should adopt a general law analysis that balances the needs of the state with
that of municipalities by considering the totality of the circumstances. In this way,
courts can balance how the state law effects the general population while focusing on
how that law effects municipal laws. This shift in focus allows for greater flexibility
by asking whether the state law is necessary, whether local laws would better suit this
issue, and whether the state law uproots important local issues. The major difference
between this test and the Canton test is the focus on municipal law.92 The Canton test
exclusively focuses on the state law and how that law operates, while the balancing
test would consider existing municipal regulations and how those laws will be
affected. This allows for a more informed and intensive analysis of how the two laws
operate together. Furthermore, a balancing approach promotes the purpose of the
Home Rule Amendment by giving municipalities the largest grant of power without
overreaching into state concerns.
Balancing tests have been used by other states throughout the country and have
been more successful at promoting the purpose of home rule. Colorado has effectively
implemented a balancing approach that has been successful in not only creating
consistency, but also in balancing the needs of both the state and locality. 93 Colorado
courts look to a number of factors, including the “relative interests of the state and the
home rule municipality,” the need for “statewide uniformity of regulation,” historical
considerations of whether the state or locality has traditionally legislated on the matter,
extraterritorial impact, and whether there can be cooperation on the subject matter. 94
Although the Canton test does appear to take some of these factors into consideration,
Colorado’s test is far more focused on both the state law and the municipal law. Thus,
Ohio should modify the Canton test to include an analysis of the municipal law.
It is true to some extent that balancing tests do not create predictable outcomes.
Balancing tests inherently give more power to judges in making decisions. But in the
context of home rule, it is the only test that can appropriately balance the needs of the
state and municipalities. The switch in focus to examining the state law and municipal
law together, rather than just the state law, is sufficient to ensure judges cannot make
92 The Canton test, however, is not irrelevant to the analysis. These are factors that the
courts should consider, but additionally, courts must also consider the municipal law and the
field of law in which both state and local are involved in. Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 968.

See Denver v. Colorado, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990) (“We have not developed a
particular test which could resolve in every case the issue . . . [i]nstead, we have made these
determinations on an ad hoc basis, taking into consideration the facts of each case.”). Colorado’s
home rule analysis differs slightly from Ohio in other respects. Namely, Colorado first
determines if the subject area is of purely local concern, mixed local and state concern, or purely
state concern. See id. When there is a mixing of state and local concern, Colorado courts use the
balancing approach to determine which law prevails when there is a direct and irreconcilable
conflict. See id.
93

Id. at 768. For more information on Colorado’s home rule provision and unique history
with home rule, see Howard C. Klemme, The Powers of Home Rule Cities in Colorado, 36 U.
COLO. L. REV. 321 (1964) (discussing the development of home rule through Denver’s demand
of independence from the state legislature); see also Alfred S. Reinhart, Municipal Home Rule
in Colorado, 28 MICH. L. REV. 382, 383–84 (1930).
94
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pure policy decisions. In the overall home rule analysis, there must be some judicial
discretion to decide what is a state matter over a local matter. The balancing test does
just that; it gives judges the ability to balance the needs of the citizens of Ohio with
the needs of state law uniformity. 95
H.

B. Ohio Should Reject the Conflict by Implication Test and Use a Pure
Head-On Collision Test
3.

1. Ohio Courts Should Reject the Conflict by Implication Test

As discussed above, Ohio originally adopted a direct conflict analysis immediately
following the passage of the Home Rule Amendment. 96 Since then, Ohio has strayed
away from the original “head-on collision” test and began implementing a “conflict
by implication” test.97 Overall, Ohio case law has failed to determine a solid and
workable rule for the conflict analysis, often times using both tests, or one or the other.
Ohio courts should clarify the conflict analysis by explicitly rejecting the conflict by
implication test because the test destroys the Home Rule Amendment and leads to
inconsistent application of the home rule conflict analysis.
“Municipalities’ constitutionally granted right to self-governance should not be
undone by implication.”98 If Ohio courts applied the conflict by implication test to its
full potential, “municipal autonomy in the important police power field would come
to an end.”99 The mere existence of a conflict by implication test essentially destroys
home rule because the test is unworkable; courts could infer a “wide array of state
regulations” to conflict with municipal regulation almost always when the subject

95 Whatever the fate of the Canton test, it is clear that the test will not continue in the same
form as it is now. The Ohio Supreme Court even eluded to abandoning the Canton test in Dayton
v. State. See Dayton v. State, 87 N.E.3d 176, 185–86 (Ohio 2017). There, the Court sidestepped
the question of the continued viability of the test because neither party argued for its reversal
and because there is no other clear test that could be used. See id. at 186.
96

See Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E. 519, 520 (Ohio 1923).

97

The conflict by implication test is relatively new in the home rule analysis first appearing
in a dissenting opinion in City of Cincinnati v. Hoffman, 285 N.E.2d 714, 725 (Ohio 1971), and
affirmatively recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of
Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776, 784 (Ohio 2006).
Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 858 N.E.2d at 798 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority’s application of the conflict by implication test with regards to a predatory lending
application essentially reads Article XVIII, Section 3 out of the Ohio Constitution because it
allows the courts to find a conflict in almost any situation).
98

99 VAUBEL, supra note 15, at 709. For Vaubel, the mere existence of a conflict by
implication test is destructive to home rule because it gives the courts the ability to make policybased decisions hidden behind the pretext of a legal rule. Further, Vaubel argues that there are
no safe guards in place to keep this rule in check, arguing that “even if limited by considerations
of reasonableness or by the fact that inferences are not to be drawn lightly” every state law could
be interpreted as conflicting in some way to any municipal ordinance in that field. Id. Other
scholars are not so sure that the conflict by implication test is unworkable, but they still
acknowledge the difficulties in applying such a test consistently. Cf. Jefferson Fordham & Joe
Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18, 47–50 (1948).
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matter is the same, or related in any fashion.100 This would lead to “[d]eadening, often
unnecessary uniformity between state statutes and municipal ordinances,” eliminating
the purpose of home rule.101 Thus, the conflict by implication test destroys the Home
Rule Amendment. Whether the Home Rule Amendment is wise is not the concern of
Ohio courts;102 it is their job to interpret the Amendment as adopted by the people. In
using the conflict by implication test, Ohio courts supplant the true meaning of the
Home Rule Amendment as adopted by the people of Ohio with their own view of the
Amendment.
Essentially, a court could almost always find a law in conflict applying the conflict
by implication test.103 A case example is illustrative. In State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck
Energy Corp.,104 the Ohio Supreme Court held that a municipal regulation requiring
oil and gas companies to obtain municipal licenses conflicted with a state law that
granted oil and gas companies licenses to frack because the municipal regulation
required the companies to comply with more restrictions than the state. 105 Thus, in
creating a law more restrictive than the state law, the court held the municipal law
conflicted with state law and could not stand. But, under the Sokol head-on collision
test the municipality should be able to regulate fracking in this way; the regulation
does not prohibit fracking entirely, but only further regulated it in accordance with the
municipality’s needs. The case falls squarely within municipal home rule authority
where a coexistence of state and municipal law could stand together. 106 Instead, the
Court held the statutes conflicted implicitly.107
However, in City of Cincinnati v. Baskin,108 the Court held that a municipal
regulation that restricted the number of bullets available in a cartridge to ten did not
conflict with a state regulation that allowed the number of bullets in a cartridge to be

100 Id. Vaubel’s prediction about the conflict by implication test appears to be coming true
as Ohio courts have thoroughly expanded what kind of conflicts exist in certain areas of the law.
101

Id. One of the many purposes of home rule was to create a system where there could be
flexibility. Thus, if the result of the conflict by implication test is “deadening uniformity,” home
rule will not have meaning.
102

Id. at 710. Proponents of the conflict by implication test argue that it is important to
recognize the complexities of modern government and that because of these complexities, a
conflict by implication test is necessary.
103 City of Cincinnati v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Ohio 2005) (“[i]f this court were to
adopt the concept of conflict purely by implication, we would essentially be holding that a
statute’s prohibiting one thing is the same as permitting everything else.”).
104

See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128, 135 (Ohio 2015).

105

See id. at 135–38.

See id. at 141 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state statute “leaves room for
municipalities to employ zoning regulations that do not conflict with the statute” such as the
municipal regulation in question here).
106

107

Id. at 135 (applying the conflict by implication test to find that the statutes in question
conflict because the municipal law essentially made obtaining a license harder than how the
state wanted it to be).
108

See Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 518–19.
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thirty-one.109 The Court did not employ the conflict by implication test, but the statutes
appear to be almost exactly alike. In Beck Energy Corp., the municipal law created
stricter regulations on fracking, 110 while in Baskin, the municipal law created stricter
regulations on guns. Yet, the court came to different conclusions on these cases. To
put it simply, the cases cannot be reconciled without extreme judicial maneuvering.
They illustrate the inconsistent nature of the conflict by implication test and reveals
how Ohio courts pick and choose which areas municipalities can regulate on and
which ones they cannot.
Proponents of a conflict by implication test point to the Ohio Supreme Court’s
decision in Schneiderman v. Sesanstein111 and argue that it is more practical given our
complex society.112 However, reliance on this authority for establishing a conflict by
implication test is misplaced. This case, and those like it, did recognize a conflict by
implication test, but the cases “involved statutory language requiring application of
the implied conflict [test].”113 Thus, the expansion of the conflict by implication test
into every home rule analysis is not truly consistent with Schneiderman; only in rare
cases where the statutory language expressly create a conflict by implication
prohibition.
Taking into consideration the historical background of home rule in Ohio, the
conflict by implication test is inconsistent with the purpose of home rule. Ohio cannot
continue to employ the conflict by implication test because it produces inconsistent,
arbitrary results and allows courts to dismiss the conflict analysis.
4.

2. Ohio Should Adopt a Pure Head-on Collision Test

The strict head-on collision test is not a perfect rule, but it is the better rule. First,
a pure head-on collision test creates judicial certainty. Second, a pure head-on collision
test effectuates the purpose of home rule and shifts the focus of the home rule analysis
back to conflicting laws, allowing municipalities flexibility in law making. Thus, Ohio
should simply ask; “Does the municipal law forbid what the state law permits?”, or
vice versa. If so, there is a conflict and the municipal law cannot stand. If not, the
statutes will coexist, unless the state law is otherwise unconstitutional.114 Additionally,
109 See id. (“the General Assembly intended to allow municipalities to regulate the
possession of lower-capacity semiautomatic firearms in accordance with local conditions”).
110

See MUNROE FALLS, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1163.02(a)(1)–(4). The ordinances
required companies to obtain licenses and to obtain them, companies needed to hold a notice
and public hearing, pay a filing fee, notify all residents of drilling who live within 1,000 feet,
and reapply for the license every year.
111

Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 167 N.E. 158, at 158 (Ohio 1929) (holding that a
municipality law prohibiting driving over fifteen miles per hour conflicted with a state law
prohibiting driving over twenty-five miles per hour).
112 See id. The argument of practicality centers around the idea that the head on collision test
is too strict and does not recognize the complexities of dual local and state rule.

Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 523 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing case law where the
court applied a conflict by implication test and finding that only in exceptional cases where it is
explicitly required did the court actually apply it).
113

114 Id. at 522. A statute could be unconstitutional by violating the general law analysis
because it merely limits a municipalities authority over police powers or otherwise constricts
the municipalities power to enact its own laws.
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courts should adopt a presumption that municipal laws are not in conflict and attempt
to harmonize the laws if possible. Only in a case where no harmonization could take
place would the municipal law be in conflict.
a.

a. A Pure Head-On Collision Test Creates Judicial Certainty

Where the conflict by implication test lacks the most is creating a set rule that
allows for predictable outcomes.115 The pure head-on collision test, however,
eliminates this issue and presents a more stable rule. The head-on collision test
enforces judicial restraint such that courts cannot pick and choose which statutes to
uphold. In other words, it either directly conflicts or it does not and the court cannot
find otherwise. This would allow municipalities to know whether their laws are
acceptable and enable them to enact laws that cooperate with state law.
Take, for example, minimum wage. 116 Recently, the City of Cleveland wanted to
pass a law that required the minimum wage to reach $15 per hour, but the state
legislature passed a law that explicitly stated that municipalities cannot increase the
minimum wage over the amount set by the state. 117 Because of the legal uncertainty
surrounding home rule, those lobbying for the City of Cleveland to increase its
minimum wage withdrew their support. To them, it was not worth the risk of losing
on the home rule issue because it would be a toss-up. New issues like this will continue
to arise in Ohio and if the courts continue to employ inconsistent tests, the future looks
more difficult than ever.
b.

b. A Pure Head-On Collision Test Effectuates the Purpose of Home Rule

The main purpose of the Home Rule Amendment was to give municipalities
authority to legislate over certain areas of the law even when the state has similarly
legislated on the same issue.118 Essentially, home rule should harmonize state and local
law; that is, the state should be able to set minimum standards and municipalities
should be able to vary from those standards as their local needs demand. 119 As shown
115 This is a result of the ability of the courts to recognize a conflict, even when there
seemingly is none. The conflict by implication test “suffers from placing unnecessary emphasis
upon inferences to be drawn when a more direct approach to conflict is available” that would
provide more consistency and simplicity in the law. Vaubel, supra note 62, at 194.
116

Minimum wage and home rule has been a hotly debated topic in recent years. In Ohio, a
group called Raise Up Cleveland began collecting signatures to obtain a $15 minimum wage in
Cleveland, but the group ultimately pulled out because of state preemption measures. Peter
Krouse, Is a Cleveland-only Minimum Wage Back in Play?, CLEVELAND.COM (June 6, 2017),
https://www.cleveland.com
/metro/index.ssf/2017/06/is_a_clevelandonly_minimum_wa.html.
See S.B. No. 331, 131st Gen. Assemb., (Ohio 2017) (“[n]o political subdivision shall
establish a minimum wage rate different from the wage rate required under this section.”). Ohio
is not the only state to pass such a law; twenty-five other states have also passed preemptive
legislation preventing municipalities from enacting minimum wages that are higher than the
states. See National Employment Law Project, Fighting Preemption: The Movement for Higher
Wages Must Oppose State Efforts to Block Local Minimum Wage Laws,
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Fighting-Preemption-Local-Minimum-Wage-Laws.pdf.
(last visited November 4, 2017).
117

118

See Section II, supra at C.

119

See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128, 144–45 (Ohio 2014).
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above, the conflict by implication test deprives municipalities of this important power,
thus creating an all-or-nothing system in which no harmonization can take place.
However, a pure head-on collision test would harmonize state and local laws, thus
effectuating the historical purposes of home rule.
Applying the pure head-on collision test to Beck Energy Corp. is demonstrative. If
a pure head-on collision test was used in that case, the court would have found that the
statutes did not conflict and municipalities would have the authority to enact
regulations on fracking.120 This result makes sense. Fracking inherently effects the
localities where it occurs and seems squarely within the dual powers set up by the
Home Rule Amendment.121 But using the conflict by implication test, the court
needlessly removed the power that municipalities have over this issue. That is, the
court could have allowed the two regulations to stand, finding no conflict under the
head-on collision test, harmonizing state and local law in the way home rule was
envisioned.122 But the court continued to use a test that does not restrain state power
as contemplated by the Home Rule Amendment. Instead, the court needlessly
disregarded one of the main purpose of home rule; to allow municipalities some power
to regulate their local needs, while also complying with state law. 123
Ohio’s approach to the conflict analysis differs from that of other states who have
managed to harmonize state and local laws. For instance, Michigan, 124 Louisiana,125

120

Regarding conflict, the Court held that the municipal ordinance prohibited what the state
law allowed, but in a strict sense this was not true. The municipal ordinance only regulated the
licensing of fracking further, not prohibiting completely what the state allowed. Thus, the Court,
if using a pure head on collision test, would easily find no conflict, seeing how the two laws
could coexist without one destroying the other. See id. at 277.
121 See generally Roxana Witter et al., Potential Exposure-Related Human Health Effects of
Oil and Gas Development 4 (2008) COLO. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH,
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/hea_08091702a.pdf (showing the negative health risks
that may be associated with fracking due to increased oil spills, air pollution, and water
contamination).

“There is no need for the state to act as the thousand-pound gorilla, gobbling up exclusive
authority over the oil and gas industry, leaving not even a banana peel of home rule for
municipalities.” Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d at 146 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting).
122

123 The constitutional framers of the Ohio home rule amendment “sought to establish a
complementary relationship between the state and the municipalities.” KRANE, RIGOS & HILL,
JR., supra note 21, at 332.
124 See Detroit v. Qualls, 454 N.W.2d 374, 385 (Mich. 1990) (“[t]he mere fact that the state
in the exercise of the police power has made certain regulations does not prohibit a municipality
from exacting additional requirements.”).
125 See Savage v. Prator, 921 So. 2d 51, 58 (La. 2006) (“this Court required the existence of
a specific state law” which prohibits the activity local governments are engaged in).
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Kansas,126 Connecticut,127 Washington,128 Colorado,129 Illinois,130 South Carolina,131
and Idaho132 have all rejected the conflict by implication test and required a direct
conflict to preempt the municipal law. Ohio should follow this well-reasoned trend
and first attempt to harmonize state and municipal laws before striking either down.
In doing so, Ohio can fulfill the purposes of home rule and allow municipalities to
have the maximum power they can as contemplated under the Home Rule
Amendment.
V.

V. CONCLUSION

It is time for the Ohio Supreme Court to act and defend the meaning of the Ohio
Constitution. The Court has failed to create a long-term solution to the home rule issue.
The current analysis is flawed because the Canton test strictly limits municipal power
in a way that is inconsistent with the Home Rule Amendment. Further, the conflict by
implication test creates judicial uncertainty and allows judges to make pure policy
decisions. Accordingly, Ohio should modify the Canton test and use a test that
balances the needs of the state with the needs of municipalities. Ohio should also reject
the conflict by implication test to stabilize this area of the law and allow municipalities
to use their powers under home rule as the Ohioans who voted for home rule
envisioned. The Ohio judiciary has consistently been called on to change the home
rule analysis to better protect its original meaning. 133 In the end, it is the courts who
126 See City of Wichita v. Hackett, 69 P.3d 621, 624 (Kan. 2003) (adopting the head on
collision test and further stating that “where both an ordinance and the statute are prohibitory
and the only difference is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition but not counter to the
prohibition in the statute . . . there is no conflict.”).
127 See Modern Cigarette, Inc. v. Town of Orange, 774 A.2d 969, 978 (Conn. 2001)
(adopting a rule that harmonizes state and municipal law, avoiding declaring either
unconstitutional through the rejection of a conflict by implication test).
128 See Brown v. City of Yakima, 807 P.2d 353, 355 (Wash. 1991) (upholding a stricter
municipal law using the conflict test described as “the ordinance must yield to the state . . . law
if a conflict exists such that the two cannot be harmonized”).
129

See Denver v. Howard, 622 P.2d 568, 570 (Colo. 1981) (reversing appellate court which
used a conflict by implication test when the correct test is whether the two statutes directly
conflict such that “they cannot coexist and be effective”).
130 See Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n v. Joliet, 324 N.E.2d 453, 456–57 (Ill. 1975)
(rejecting the argument that a restriction on municipal authority “could emanate from the statute
even though there is no express restriction on home-rule powers.”).
131 See Charleston v. Jenkins, 133 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 1963) (“Unless legislative
provisions are contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist, they are not deemed
inconsistent because of mere lack of uniformity in detail.”).
132 See Taggart v. Latah County, 298 P.2d 979, 982 (Idaho 1956) (holding that municipal
restrictions on the sale of beer did not conflict with state law because it was not unreasonable,
discriminatory, and was not so restrictive, but promoted a reasonable police power instead).

It is left to the Ohio judiciary to “reassert [its] role as the defender of constitutional Home
Rule against unnecessarily expansive invasions by legislative authority, the predatory nature of
which was so evidence in pre-Home Rule days, which have never been confined fully since then
and now are gaining general credence as the ‘new theory’ of the oncoming age.” Vaubel, supra
note 62 at 148.
133
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can breathe back life into home rule, or let it slowly dissipate. But to let home rule die
would be a great misfortune because “government is best which is closest to the
people.”134

134

Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress on the Right to Vote, in PUBLIC PAPERS
287, 288 (1965).
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